Health status and retirement decisison for older european couples. by Jiménez-Martín, Sergi et al.
Working Paper 99-82 
Economics Series 30 
October 1999 
Departamento de Economfa 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
Calle Madrid,  126 
28903 Getafe (Spain) 
Fax (34) 91  624-98-75 
HEALTH STATUS AND RETIREMENT DECISIONS FOR OLDER EUROPEAN 
COUPLES ** 
Sergi Jimenez-Martfn, Jose M.  Labeaga and Maite Martinez-Granado * 
Abstract --------------------------------
In  this  paper we  use data the  European Community Household Panel  (ECHP) to  describe and 
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existence  of complementarities  in  leisure  and/or  assortative  matting  and  the  effects  of health 
variables.  Concerning the evidence, we  first find  that a working spouse is  more likely to  retire 
the more recently the other spouse has retired;  this effect is  stronger if the  wife is  the  working 
spouse.  Second, there is  evidence of assortative mating and/or complementarities in leisure; the 
effects  of all  relevant  factors  on  the  retirement  decision  of one  spouse  depend  strongly  on 
whether the  other one is  working, unemployed, or retired.  Third, besides the  standard evidence 
that poor health increases the  retirement probabiliby,  we  find  that the husband's health affects 
the  couple's retirement decisions  much more  strongly than the  wife's health does.  Additional 
asymmetric effects are detected with respect to income related variables. 
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Although the retirement decisions of older workers (especially men) have been widely studied,l much 
less  is  known  about  the joint labour force  behaviour of older married  couples.  However this  topic 
becomes  important  given  the  growing  proportion  of married  women  that  approach  old  age  with 
substantial  work  histories.  A  strong  evidence  of joint  retirement  patterns  will  have  important 
implications for the analysis of the effects of any retirement policy. More specifically any policy that 
increases the incentive for one member of a married (cohabiting) couple to exit the labour force  will 
have  additional  effects  on  the  labour  force  behaviour  of the  other  spouse.  Among  the  different 
determinants of retirement such as economic variables or pension provisions, health related factors are 
bound to play a crucial role in retirement decisions of older couples.
2  In  fact,  all the pension systems 
have  specific  treatment  for  people  retiring  because  of health  or disability  reasons.  Health  status  is 
particularly relevant in explaining joint retirement since sometimes one spouse has to withdraw from the 
labour market to care for the other one. Although there are a few studies on this issue using US  data,
3 
and  despite its  interest,  only  Blau  and  Riphahn  (1999) present an  analysis  about joint retirement in 
Germany. 
Several  reasons  can  justify  the  existence  of joint  retirement.  First,  there  could  be  observable 
economic  factors  affecting both  members  of the  couple  and  causing a  positive  correlation  between 
retirement  dates.  Second,  poor  health  or  chronic  illness  may  influence  not  only  individual  own 
retirement but may increase the necessity of care giving and, consequently, influence spouses retirement 
behaviour.  Also  unobservable  factors  highly  correlated  between  husbands  and  wives  (assortative 
matting) could originate such a correlation. Finally, strong complementarities between the husband and 
wife's leisure time would explain why couples tend to retire at the same time. 
In  this paper we examine whether or not the pattern of joint retirement is  a common feature of the 
European  labour  market  and  if so,  which  are  the  determinants  of such  behaviour.  To  understand 
retirement  decisions  and,  among  them,  retirement  of couples  seems  especially  important  when  the 
sustainability of the  actual pension systems  is becoming a public debate in Europe.
4  Any retirement 
policy to implement should account for cross-effects among the members of a couple. The sign of these 
cross-effects will depend on how the labour supply of the spouses interacts. Strong complementarities in 
leisure will induce one spouse to retire when the other does it while the opposite effect could be found 
when leisure for the members of the couple is a substitute. In the latter case if one spouse compulsory 
retires the other spouse could increase hislher labour supply to keep the household income at the original 
level  (added  worker effect).  The European  Community Household  Panel  (ECHP)  provides  a  unique 
lSee for instance Stock and Wise (1990), Berkovec and Stern (1994), Blau (1994) or Gmber and Wise (1999). 
1nere are a few studies focusing on the effects of health status in an individual context. Some examples are Sickles 
and Taubman (1986), Bound et at (1999) or Dwyer and Mitchell (1999). 
3See Blau (1998), Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) or Hurd (1990) as good examples. All  of them in one way or 
another include health-related variables in their models. 
1 source of comparison across European countries that allow us to exploit individual and country specific 
differences  relating  retirement.  The  ECHP collects  information  on  a  wide  range  of socio-economic 
characteristics (personal and household demographic characteristics, labour force  status, health status, 
etceteras) as described in the Appendix. 
Given  the  nature  of the  problem  to  analyse  (uncertainties  concerning  the  magnitude,  timing, 
frequency  of job  offers  and  the  duration  of jobs),  labour  market  histories  are  best  described  as 
realisations of a stochastic process. Within this framework, flow rates between labour market states are 
the object of study. A household utility function can be derived allowing for dependence of one person's 
strategy on the employment status of other household members. In such a setting the allocation of time 
and income is completely determined by the state occupied. A way to take into account the joint labour 
supply decisions for married couples is to consider the set of possible states the household can be in (for 
instance: both members working, wife working-husband non working, etceteras). Transitions from and to 
any of the possible states can be constructed and compared. As an advantage, this approach allows the 
labour  market  decisions  of both  spouses  to  be  endogenous  while  controlling  for  observable  and 
unobservable characteristics. 
Recent evidence shows that joint retirement is frequent among married couples. In fact, most of the 
applied papers using either US or European data (see Zweimiiller et ai,  1996 who use Austrian data, 
Blau, 1998 using US data or Blau and Riphahn, 1999 using German data) show clear indication of joint 
retirement due to correlation in unobservable effects or "assortative matting" (for instance, the effect of 
joint leisure or joint wealth in  preferences). European evidence (Zweimiiller et aI,  1996 with US  and 
Austrian  data or Blau and  Riphahn,  1999 using German  data)  shows  that higher wages  or earnings 
decrease the  incentive to  withdraw from the labour force.  However, Blau (1998)  finds  contradictory 
results using US data. 
Concerning the effect of health variables on retirement, Blau (1998), using two simple indicators of 
the  health  status  of both  members  of the  couple,  shows  that poor health  has  a  significant negative 
(positive) effect on entry (exit) rates, specially for the husband. Cross-spouse health effects are mainly 
small but there are interesting exceptions. For instance, when the wife is employed and the husband is 
not,  poor health  of the  husband  reduces  the  wife's  exit rate  by  16%.  This  suggests  that the  health 
insurance provided by the wife's employer may be specially valuable to a couple when the husband'.s is 
covered by the wife's plan and is in  poor health. Bound et al. (1999) show that poor health lead older 
workers to withdraw from the labour force, but the earlier a health shock occurs, the less likely is to lead 
to labour force exit. Finally, Blau and Riphahn (1999) find that a subjective health satisfaction variable 
and the presence and degree of an officially recognised handicap have no impact on transition rates of 
men and women. A chronic disease increases the workers' incentives to leave employment. They also 
found asymmetric cross effects for this variable. 
4See Boldrin et al (1999) or Gruber and Wise (1999) as recent examples. 
2 
Hi Among our results we find a strong evidence of complementary, but asymmetric, effects between the 
labour supply decisions of both spouses. It seems that the husband's decision affects more his  wife's 
decision than vice versa, whatever the origin state of the spouse. Furthermore, we do not find evidence 
supporting the "added worker effect". With regard to health variables, we find, as in most studies, that 
own poor health provides both members of the couples with  incentives to  withdraw from the labour 
force. More importantly, the magnitude of these health effects depend on the labour force status of the 
spouse  suggesting  either  complementarities  in  leisure  or  correlation  in  the  unobservables  of both 
spouses. Additionally, we find important and asymmetric cross-effects. In that sense, it is  striking how 
crucial is the husband's health status in explaining joint retirement. Concerning demographic variables, 
self-employed  or highly  educated  individuals  have  lower  probabilities  of leaving  the  labour  force. 
Finally, work income also shows asymmetric effects with a general pattern of negative influence on the 
probability of leaving the labour force. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of the ECHP, the 
pension systems and  the behaviour of individuals within the sample.  Section 3 presents the empirical 
model to be implemented and Section 4 analyses the estimation results. The conclusions are elaborated 
in Section 5. 
2. Data and stylised facts on labour force behaviour of married couples in Europe 
2.1. The ECHP 
The data analysed in  this  paper comes from the ECHP and contains information for  12  European 
countries. The focus of the ECHP is on household income and living conditions across EU12 countries. 
Eurostat  achieves  comparability  across  countries  through  a  standardised  design  of the  survey  and 
common  technical  and  implementation  procedures,  with  centralised  support  and  coordination  of the 
national surveys. Time comparability is  achieved by keeping the time between successive waves for a 
given  country  close  to  a calendar year and  by  keeping  the  questionnaire  similar from  one  wave  to 
another as  much  as  possible.  Information  about the sample size, response rates  and  attrition  rates  is 
showed in Table 1. 
The structure of the data is described in Figure 1. The interviews are collected at some point during 
the year (1994,  for wave  1,  and  1995,  for  wave  2)  and the questionnaire concentrates in the current 
individual and household information as  well as  on detailed information about previous calendar year. 
As the  interviews were made almost at any  month during the year depending on  the country and the 
wave, one way of homogenising the information is to use the retrospective information to analyse the 
labour market transitions. In this way, transitions from one labour status to another will refer to the same 
span of time for every country instead of referring to the interview date that vary across countries and 
waves. In addition, income variables refer also to the previous calendar year, and therefore concentrating 
on transitions of this type seems more appropriate. 
3 Table 1. Number of Household, non response and attrition in waves 1 and 2 
Wave!  Wave 2 
COUNTRY  Sample  Response  Sample  Response  Attrition 
Size  Rate  Size  Rate  Rate 
Germany  5054  48  4753  91  8 
Denmark  3482  62  3225  83  12 
Netherlands  5187  88  5110  89  9 
Belgium  4189  84  4012  87  10 
Luxembourg  1011  41  962  94  6 
France  7344  79  6722  90  11 
UK  5779  72  4548  84  23 
Ireland  4048  56  3584  82  14 
Italy  7115  91  7128  91  5 
Greece  5323  90  5219  89  9 
Spain  7226  67  6521  87  12 
Portugal  4881  89  4955  90  4 
EU12  60819  72  56700  87  10 
Austria  na  na  3382  68 
EU13  na  na  60062 
Source: ECHP Data Quality (Eurostat) 
na: not available. Austria was not part of the sample in 1994. 
Response rate: proportion successfully interviewed of  households eligible for interview in the given wave. 
Attrition rate: refers to households as approximation from the attrition rates for longitudinal sample units (individuals) 
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The paper concentrates on  information from waves 1 and 2,  the ones available at the moment, and 
excludes  from  the  analysis  two  countries:  Austria,  for  which  the  panel  contains  only  one  wave  of 
information, and the Netherlands, which does not contain any retrospective question in its questionnaire. 
That gives us two complete years of information about job status transitions, income and individual and 
household characteristics including health related variables. 
4 2.2. Some lessons from the data 
A close observation to the data provides some useful information that should be accounted for when 
proposing an empirical model to estimate. Evidence on the behaviour of males, females and couples is 
presented in this section. 
In principle, every individual could be in  any  of three  states:  working,  unemployed or out of the 
labour force. Figure 2 shows the age profile of the labour force activities in wave 2 (1995) for males and 
females in the twelve European countries considered. For males (Figure 2.a), the age profiles of labour 
force activities have similar shapes in all the countries. For females (Figure 2.b) some differences among 
Northern and Southern countries can be appreciated. Nevertheless, given the similar shapes of the age 
profiles,  the figure  suggests that a joint analysis for Europe can be implemented once correcting for 
country specific factors. It is also interesting to point out how the exit from the labour force is somehow 
quicker for Europe than for the US  (see, for instance, Peracchi and Welch,  1994) as a more stepper age 
profile predicts. 
Figure 3 shows the age profile of labour force transitions for males (Figure 3.a) and females (Figure 
3.b) for the joint sample of European countries. As  a reference initial point in time is December 1993 
and the final  point is  December 1994.  The central line shows the fraction of individuals that actually 
change  labour  force  status  between  the  two  periods.  It  therefore  uses  only  individuals  with  valid 
interviews  in  both  waves.  The  upper and  lower bounds  correct for  the  existence of attrition.
5  Both 
figures are similar the ones shown in, for instance, Peracchi and Welch (1994), who analyse the case of 
the US. Transitions from employment and unemployment to out of the labour force show the same age 
profile.  A  significant fraction  of individuals,  especially  among  males,  start  leaving the  labour force 
before they are sixty years old. For both males and females, exit from the labour force picks at 60 and 
65,  showing the age  of early and  normal retirement for  most  of the  European countries  considered. 
Unemployed individuals tend to retire more than employed. It is also clear from Figures 3.a and 3.b that 
once an older individual leaves the labour force it tends to remain inactive for the rest of herlhis life, 
there is not much re-entry to the labour force. 
From the  broad picture presented in  previous  figures,  we  can  concentrate now  in  the  retirement 
decisions. Figures 3.a and 3.b suggested that with respect to retirement we can analyse transitions from 
participation to non-participation since the shape of the transitions from unemployment and employment 
were  similar.  Furthermore,  it  also  showed  that  unemployment,  despite  being  a  clear pathway  into 
retirement  in  most  of the  countries,  could  not  strictly  be  considered  a form  of inactivity  for  older 
individuals,6 since it is  a much  less absorbing state. Therefore in Figures 4.a and 4.b  we  present the 
5The upper bound shows the transition profile if all individuals not interviewed in the second wave will have transit. 
The lower bound shows the transition profile if none of the individuals not interviewed in the second wave will have 
change the status. 
6Blau (1998) uses this definition of inactivity for older individuals in the US. 
5 hazard rates to retirement for EU12 males and females, respectively. The origin state is participation and 
the destination is to be out of the labour force. Again, the similarities across countries are striking apart 
from some exceptions and in  spite of the small  sample size for  some of the age ranges in  particular 
countries. In general, the conclusions from the aggregate analysis hold for the disaggregated by country 
analysis: individuals start retiring before they are 60 although there are exit picks when they are 60 and 
65 year old. For females this retirement pattern is less clear, but there are also less observations for older 
women. 
All previous evidence suggest that when analysing exit from the labour force behaviour we need to 
look also to individuals younger than 60. The age of cut that we select is 55 and 50 years for males and 
females respectively. In our sample an individual is defined as retired when slhe declares herlhimself as 
SO,7  but also when given the age condition slhe is  in another type of economic inactivity (e.g., house 
keeping). Furthennore, retirement is considered as an absorbing state, that is, once the individual enters 
in  it  slhe  remains  there  forever  afterwards.  Thus  we  analyse  transitions  from  any  fonn  of activity 
(employment or unemployment)  to  inactivity, defining this one as  retirement. As a first  approach we 
consider two  moments  in  time:  to,  December  1993,  and  tJ,  December of 1994.  The reason  for  such 
simplification is the scarce and concentrated number of transitions that can be found in every quarter. 
8 
Using these criteria we  select a sample of couples to  analyse joint retirement. As  retirement is an 
absorbing state, for every couple at least one member must be participating in the labour force at to. That 
gives us a sample of 4639 couples with valid values for all variables in the analysis. Figure 5 presents the 
labour force participation for husbands (top left panel of Figure 5) and wives (top right panel) separately 
and  jointly (bottom panel)  for  March  1994,  a  time  point  in  the  middle  of the  observation  period, 
respectively. The profiles for husbands and for wives are similar to those presented in Figures 2.a and 
2.b. for respectively the whole sample of males and females. For husbands there is a gradual declination 
in employment from the age of 55. This declination is sharper for wives after 55. Trends in joint labour 
force status shown in Figure 5 indicate that the incidence of the husband working and the wife out of the 
labour force is roughly constant at about 40 per cent until the husband's age of 60, while the rate of both 
members  working declines gradually during these  ages.  The incidence of wives  working  while their 
husband are out of the labour force remains almost constant at around 8 per cent until the husband is 70 
years old. This could be accounted for by wives considerably younger than their husbands.
9 
It  is  crucial  to  answer  how  often  does  joint retirement  occur.  For instance,  the  probability  of 
retirement is higher for males if their wives are already retired (21.64) than without controlling for the 
7 Alternative definitions of retirement combining the self-reported labour force status with the reception of old age or 
invalidity related  benefits yield  similar results  although  originate  a  substantial  drop  in  the  number of observed 
transitions. Approximately a quarter of the sample in self-reported retirement declares not receiving any old age 
benefit. Results using these alternative definitions are available from the authors on request. 
sA vailability of new data waves will help to overcome this problem allowing a more detailed monthly or quarterly 
transition analysis. Blau (1998) indicates some advantages and disadvantages of using monthly of quarterly versus 
annual data. 
9Blau (1998) presented similar evidence for the US. 
6 wives' status (18.41). Furthennore, if the wife retires during the period considered (December 1993 to 
December 1994) the probability of the husband retiring increases up to 27.4 percent. For wives these 
figures  are  more  striking:  if the  husband  retires  during  the  observation  period  the  probability  of 
retirement for the  wife  increases  16  percentage  points
lO  (from  19.7  to  36.1  percent).  Note that  the 
influence of one spouse's labour force status in the transition from activity to inactivity of hislber couple 
is not symmetric, being women more sensible to the condition of their husbands. 
2.3. Retirement related to health variables 
From previous studies,11 health has revealed as one of the major determinants of labour force behaviour 
for older men and women. Poor health leads many older workers to withdraw from the labour force. 
However how to measure health is not a straightforward question. Retirement studies have commonly 
used global questions as  "Does health limit the amount or kind of work you can perfonn?" or "How 
would you rate your health? Is it excellent, very good, good, fair or poor?". Bound et al (1999) show for 
the US  that these measures can be endogenous to the labour force status as  well as  not measuring the 
actual  level  of health.  Their approach  implies  the  estimation  of an  unobservable  index  of health, 
thorough the observable self-reported health status, using as explanatory variables exogenous factors (as 
education and age) as well as more detailed health measures available in the data set they use, the Health 
and Retirement Survey (HRS). 
The ECHP does not contain as detailed infonnation as the HRS with respect to functional limitations 
or specific health conditions. It does  however include additional questions to the traditional ones. In 
particular it records whether the individual has any chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or 
disability. Individuals are also asked if they have been admitted to a hospital as in-patients
l2 and how 
many times slbe has consulted a doctor a dentist or an optician13 during the past 12 months. Although all 
of these measures reflect only partially the actual individual health status they are plausible indicators of 
it. Our reduced fonn approach here consists on analysing the effect of those indicators on the retirement 
decisions instead of using them to estimate and predict a health index (see Bound et al.,  1999). This 
makes  maximal  use  of the  available  infonnation  on  health  status.14  Additionally,  to  minimise  the 
possible endogeneity of the health variables all of them refer to the previous year. A detailed description 
of the variables is contained in the Appendix. 
Does  health  influence joint retirement decisions? Table 4  describes  the  health  status  for couples 
according to  the  type  of transition  the  couple  made  between  December 93  and  December 94.  It  is 
l<For the US Blau (1998) found that between 30.3 per cent and 40.6 per cent of couples exit the labour force within 
1 year of each other. 
llSee Sickles and Taubman (1986), Blau and Riphan (1999) or Bound et at (1999) as examples. 
lz-rhe number of nights spent in a hospital as in-patient are confidential information for Germany and therefore will 
not be used in this study. 
13Visits to a doctor, optician or dentist are aggregated for the first wave. 
14See Anderson y Burkhauser (1985) for details about measures and problems of health variable. 
7 noticeable that individuals, especially males,  who  retire during that period or who  are  already retired 
seem to have poorer health than those who remain working. Also poor health condition of the husband is 
asymmetrically  associated  with joint retirement  when  both spouses  are  initially  working.  This  could 
suggest that the wives tend to retire to provide care to their husbands. This is  confirmed by  Table 5, 
which presents the probability of retirement given the health condition and labour force  status of the 
spouse. There is an  increase in  the probability of retirement of 2 percentage points for husbands and 
wives  due  to  the  health  condition  of the  other spouse.  This  probability  increases  even  more  when 
conditioning on retirement of the spouse during the sample period of time and the effect is especially 
strong for wives. For males, although there is an increase in the probability of retirement, this is smaller 
than  the  increase  without  conditioning  on  health  status  of the  wife.  Undoubtedly,  the  fact  that  the 
husband is often the main contributor to family earnings helps explain this particular evidence. 
When the husband is working while the wife is out of the labour force, the proportion of wives with 
poor health indicators is  higher when the husband retires. In  fact  this is  the women's group  with the 
poorest health indicators, suggesting again some kind of care provision from the husband. The reverse is 
also true when the wife is  the one who  is  working although the differences on  their husbands'  health 
status are not that strong, being the wife  own  health status much  worse  in  relative terms.  In  general 
terms, the health status of retired husbands with working wives is poorer than for the rest of males. Then 
it seems that the wife tend to  remain in  the labour market until she can, given her own  health status, 
suggesting that health insurance provided by the wife's employer may be especially valuable for these 
couples. 
8 Table 4. Health status by type of transition 
Origin state  Both employed  Husband employedlWife OLF  Wife employed/Husband OLF 
Destination State  Both employed  Wife retires  Husband retires  Both retire  Remain  Husband retires  Remain  Wife retires 
Husband Age  59.66  60.77  61.56  64.20  60.18  63.42  62.76  66.36 
In good health  61.45  64.57  43.59  45.45  61.58  49.41  38.96  36.07 
Chronic condition  22.80  19.43  40.17  43.94  22.07  35.24  48.88  44.81 
Hampered in daily activities  21.45  18.29  31.62  36.36  20.13  34.45  45.57  46.45 
Admitted as in-patient  6.86  8.00  14.53  25.76  7.88  18.90  14.09  16.39 
Visits to doctor 1-5 times  59.23  62.86  59.83  53.03  55.56  53.35  43.65  44.26 
Visits to doctor >5  20.87  14.86  29.91  34.85  21.26  31.10  45.74  47.54 
Wife Age  55.50  57.68  57.15  61.09  57.61  60.60  57.2  61.63 
In good health  58.74  56.57  60.68  53.03  49.22  36.61  54.09  45.90 
Chronic condition  22.80  29.71  28.20  21.21  30.38  35.04  23.48  29.51 
Hampered in daily activities  22.03  26.86  23.93  24.24  31.73  39.17  24.00  30.05 
Admitted as in-patient  7.73  7.43  6.84  10.61  10.36  11.81  5.04  10.38 
Visits to doctor 1-5 times  57.29  53.14  61.54  51.52  51.32  50.00  52.70  48.63 
Visits to doctor >5  29.95  31.43  23.93  28.79  35.02  39.76  35.45  37.16 
Both chronic condition  9.37  8.00  11.97  13.64  10.90  17.72  15.83  16.39 
N. OBSERVATIONS  1035  175  117  66  1853  508  575  183 
Table 5. Probability of retirement between December 1993 and December 1994: conditional to spouse retirement and health status 
Wife poor health  Husband poor health 
Retired between  Wife poor health  Retired between  Husband poor health  Unconditional 
Dec 93-Dec 94  Dec 93-Dec 94 
Husband  24.36  20.97  27.95  18.41 
Wife  22.53  41.30  21.76  19.71 
. .  ..  Poor health: mdlVldual suffenng from a chrome condItIOn or bemg adlTIltted as m-patient m a hospItal 
9 3. Empirical specification 
No controls for personal or household characteristics have been considered in the evidence presented 
in the previous section. To do so, an empirical fully parametric specification is proposed in this one. We 
assume that preferences are given by a household utility function. Savings behaviour is exogenous in this 
context given the difficulty of empirically modelling savings and labour supply jointly15.  In such setting 
the  allocation  of time  and  income  is  completely  determined  by  the  state  occupied,  as  Burdett  and 
Mortensen (1978) showed. Each member of the couple can be participating or not participating in the 
labour market. Participating must be understood as being working or unemployed but looking for job and 
not participating collects people in any other situation. Therefore, the household as a whole can be in 
any of the four following states: 
1 =  Both spouses participating 
2 = Husband participating, wife non participating 
3 =  Husband non participating, wife participating 
4 = Both non participating 
Transitions  from  and  to  any  of the  four  states  can  be  then  constructed  producing  a  matrix  of 
transitions as below. 
MATRIX! 
Joint destination State 
Joint origin state  1  2  3  4 
1  7r12(X;/312 )  7r13(X;/313 )  7r14(X;/3 14 ) 
2  Not considered  Not considered  7r24 (X;/3 24 ) 
3  Not considered  Not consid~red  7r34(X;/3 34 ) 
4  Not considered  Not considered  Not considered 
Transitions implying a re-entry in the labour force from non-participation are not considered here 
since we assume non-participation (retirement) is  an  absorbing state. Each element of the  matrix,  7rij' 
represents the probability of making a transition from state i to state j at time t. In a reduced form, these 
probabilities depend on the demographic and economic characteristics (age, education, income, country 
specific legislation ... ), Xi, that shape the latent comparison of utilities that originates a change of status 
15See  B1au  (1998)  or Martfnez-Granado  (1998),  among others,  for  similar specifications  when  dealing with  the 
labour  supply  of couples.  On  the  other  hand,  Diamond  and  Hausman  (1984)  present  an  analysis  about  the 
relationship between retirement and savings. 
10 and  on  a  vector  of parameters,  /3,  which  parameterises  them.  This  specification  allows  for  state 
dependence, that is, the effect of the variables varies with the origin and destination states. 
In principle quarterly or monthly transitions could be considered and duration in every state used as 
an explanatory variable (duration dependence). However, as  mentioned above, the span of time is not 
long enough  to  avoid the  problems derived from  the concentration of transitions on  some  particular 
months. Therefore we choose a simpler approximation by ignoring the transition time and concentrating 
only on the destination to which exit took place. We look at the origin state at to (December 1993) and 
compare it with the destination state at t] (December of 1994). Then we  have in  effect a  qualitative 
response model. Two waves of data are not enough to control by couple specific unobservable heterogeneity, 
therefore estimation of the  matrix above, when  assuming transition intensities of the proportional Weibull 
form, is equivalent to estimate three separated equations conditional on the origin state: 
1.  When the origin state is that both spouses are on the labour force, identification of /312,  /3/3  and /3l4 
reduces to estimate a multinomiallogit in the second period. We consider the following states: both 
spouses  participating,  the  husband  participating and  the  wife  not,  the  wife  participating and  the 
husband not and both spouses out of the labour force. 
2.  When the origin state is that the husband is in the labour force while the wife is not, identification of 
/324 comes from estimation of a logit on the second period over two states: the husband in the labour 
force and the wife out and both retired. 
3.  When the origin state is that the wife is in the labour force while the husband is out, identification of 
/334 follows the estimation of a logit on the second period over the corresponding two destination states. 
An  alternative to the family utility model sketched above wiII  be to specify a bargaining model of 
intrahousehold allocation, as the one in Browning et al (1994).16 This approach imposes much stronger 
data requirements  and  will  be  left  for  further  research.  To  implement  such  model  two  alternatives, 
among others, can be chosen. From the bargaining model two equations of labour force participation can 
be derived, one for the husband and one for the wife. There must also be a sharing rule determining the 
allocation of time and goods between them. As long as the age difference between the spouses or the 
difference in income expected after retirement could be variables which affect the sharing rule. On the 
one hand the two equations affected by the sharing rule could be jointly estimated. On the other hand we 
could leave unspecified the sharing rule and estimate jointly the two equations allowing for correlation 
and  theoretical  restrictions  among  them.  This  last  approach  imposes  stronger coherence  restrictions 
although is  easier to identify. The advantage of this line of research over the model presented in  this 
paper is that it does not impose a reciprocal influence of the labour force status of both spouses. This 
16  See Blundell et al.  (1999) for a collective approach to  labour supply, which takes account of participation and 
heterogeneity. 
11 would be relevant if for instance the wife labour force decisions are affected by her husband's ones but 
the reverse is not true. 
4. Results 
Before  presenting the  results  for  couples,  we  estimate  individual  retirement  models  for  males  and 
females. In particular, conditional on working at to,  we estimate, in the second period, a logit separately 
for males and for females. These results are discussed in Section 4.1, while the results for couples are 
presented in section 4.2. The Data Appendix gives a detailed discussion and definition of the variables 
used  in  the  analysis.  Although  we  claim for  a  reduced form  model,  we  are aware that  most  of the 
variables are possibly endogenous
l7 and therefore correlated with the error term. We use variables dated 
at period to. This allows us to consider them predetermined at to.  given the initial labour force status and, 
under the null of absence of correlation in the errors. 
4.1. Individual estimations. 
The individual Logit results for males and females are shown in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. Three 
sets of estimates are presented.  IS First two columns in each table are the estimates for the whole sample 
of males  older than  54 and  females  older than  49  (5032  and  4171  observations  respectively)  using 
country dummies as explanatory variables. The third and fourth columns present the same specification 
by replacing the country dummies for country specific variables as defined in the Data Appendix. Last 
two columns show the estimates for a subsample of workers not self-employed.
19 
Starting for the male estimation, results are quite similar whether excluding or not self-employed 
individuals. First of all there is a strong quadratic (concave) effect of age. However the effect at early 
ages (before 60) is still of great importance, since the population at risk is larger. Additionally the effect 
of the  dummies  for  ages  60  and  65  is  very  strong  and  significant  showing  the  general  pattern  of 
retirement for Europe that we saw in Figure 4. The more the household depends on the male for survival 
the smaller the probability of retirement is. This can be seen through the negative and significant effect 
of variables such as being the head of the household, household size or individual income relative the 
household  income,  whether  from  work  or  non-work  private  sources.  Marriage  and  specially 
separationldivorce/widowhood seem to have a positive effect on the probability of  exiting the labour force. 
17 See Bound et al (1998) for an instrumental variable treatment of the endogeneity on self-reported health variables, 
or Blau (1998) for endogeneity of income variables. 
18 A separate estimation for every country was implemented but most of the variables could not be identified because 
of the small sample size for many countries. For a comparison grouping the countries by north - south see Jimenez-
Martin (1999). 
19Self-employment represents on average 38 per cent and 20 per cent of the male and female workforce in this range 
of ages. It is a self reported status and further investigation on this aspect should be done. For some countries like 
Greece, Portugal or Ireland the figures for self-employed males amount to 65 per cent, 49 per cent and 55 per cent 
of the labour force respectively. These incredible high figures may reflect strong differences in the definition of the 
self-employment status. 
12 Self-employment has a negative effect on the probability of retiring. Several explanations could fit 
that effect: lower replacement rate for self-employed individuals, more attachment to the labour market 
since they run  their own  businesses  or impossibility  of using the early  retirement  schemes  in  some 
countries, etc. To be unemployed in the origin state does not seem to have any effect on the probability 
of retirement for males. On the other hand, education influences negatively the probability of retirement. 
A higher degree of education is associated with less physical jobs and with particular preferences about 
leisure. The occupational dummies  work in  the  same  direction,  being the  manual  workers  (excluded 
category) prone to retire. 
The potential  experience  accumulated  by  the  individual  increases  the  probability  of leaving  the 
labour  force.  The  more  years  the  individual  has  already  been  working  the  easier  to  fulfil  the 
requirements to get a pension. These eligibility conditions are hardly satisfied by foreign workers, which 
have,  as  a consequence,  a  lower probability  of retiring.  To  hold  a  part time job also  increases  the 
probability of retirement,  reflecting less  attachment to  the  labour market or an  intermediate position 
between full time work and retirement. 
Health variables show the expected signs: good health reduces the probability of retirement while a 
chronic illness or being admitted as  in-patient at a hospital increases it.  To visit often a doctor is  for 
males a clear sign of poor health, thereby increasing the probability of exiting the labour force.  Notice 
that the self-assessed health variable is not significant after controlling by the remaining health indicators.
2o 
With  respect  to  the  country  specific  variables,  there  are  clear differences  across  countries.  The 
omitted and comparison category when using country dummies is  Germany. The results suggest that 
countries as Luxembourg, France or Italy have a much higher probability of retirement while countries 
as  Portugal, Ireland or Denmark have a much  lower one.  These differences in  countries are basically 
explained  by  the  different  regulations  about  retirement.  When  replacing  the  country  dummies  for 
specific characteristics of the countries much of the explanatory power is retained. The more significant 
effects  are those  of the  normal  retirement age  and  of the  Social Protection  Expenditure (SPE).  The 
higher the normal retirement age in a country, the lower the probability of exiting the labour market is. 
On the contrary, the higher the per capita expenditure on Social Protection in a country the higher the 
probability of retiring. Puzzling enough the higher the life expectancy after 65 the higher the probability 
of  exiting the labour market.
21 
Turning now to  the results for females  in Table 5 they  are in  general  worse determined than for 
males. Most of the effects hold apart from some differences that we shall comment now. The effect of 
marital status has the opposite sing than for males:  single women seem to retire more than married or 
divorced ones. Unemployment in the initial period has now a positive effect on retirement: it is easier to 
2<>ntis  is  an  important result since there  is  evidence on endogeneity of self-assesed health variables in  retirement 
models (see Bound et ai, 1999). 
21 At the moment, results respond to a cross-section perspective. New data waves would make possible to exploit also a 
time series dimension accounting for changes in the countries regulation across time and improving the results. 
13 retire once the woman  is  unemployed (discouragement, loss of contact with the labour market, etc.). 
Although the health variables work in the same direction than for males, the visits to the doctor do not 
seem to reflect a poor health condition and therefore have no effect on the probability of retiring.
22 When 
using country  dummies,  the  effect of country  is  similar to  the  one  found  for  males.  However these 
differences  across  countries are  not  well  explained by  regulation  differences.  When  substituting the 
country dummies for the country specific variables we lose explanatory power as well as find not well 
defined effects for those variables. Therefore it seems that there are more behavioural differences among 
women than among men across Europe as was already suggested from Figures 2.a and 2.b in Section 2. 
4.2. loint estimation. 
Concerning the joint estimation proposed in section 3, we deal here with a discrete-choice model and 
therefore the parameter estimates  are  not directly informative. They  appear in  the  Appendix  and  we 
concentrate  here  on  the  discussion  of Tables  6,  7  and  8  that  present  simulations  of the  transition 
probabilities,  based  on  the  estimated  parameters.  The  effects  of a  given  variable  on  the  transition 
probabilities from a particular state were simulated by computing transition probabilities for a reference 
couple
23  and  allowing  changes  on  the  variable  which  effects  we  want  to  assess.  Table 6  show  the 
simulation from the estimates of a logit conditional on the case in which the husband is participating and 
the wife is out of the labour force at period to. Table 7 contains the simulations for the logit conditional 
on the case in which the husband is out of the labour force and the wife is participating at period to.  And 
finally, Table 8 present the simulations obtained from the multinomial logit conditional on the case in 
which  both  spouses  were  participating  at  period  to  using  country  dummies.  In general  results  are 
coherent with the separate individual estimations presented above, although some new facts reveal from 
the joint estimation. 
Let us  start with  the retirement decisions of one member of the couple when the other is already 
retired (Tables 6 and 7). The more relevant effects are found through age, health status, job status in the 
origin period and the living arrangements of the couple. Age has, as expected, a strong positive effect, 
especially for women. The probability of the husband retiring increases from 7.2 per cent to 23.3 per 
cent as he ages from 55 to 60 years and to 55.4 per cent when he reach the 65 years of age. For wives the 
probability of retiring increases from 2.3 per cent to 28.1 per cent and to 43.4 per cent when she passes 
22Women  have  reasons  for  visiting  the  doctor  which  are  not  related  to  poor health  and  we  cannot distinghish 
amongst them. Anyway, interations between age and the number of visits to the doctor were included in an initial 
specification in order to account for the different reasons driving women to visit the doctor (for example, maternity). 
However they were not significant and therefore are not included in the final specification. 
23The  reference couple has  the following  characteristics:  husband 55  years old  and  wife 52, none of them  with 
higher education, none unemployed in the initial period, both starting their working lifes at  18,  with no part-time 
job, none  working  in  the  public  sector,  none  self-employed,  living independently and  without any  other family 
member. The shares of the household income for the reference couple are : 25  per cent wife income, 50 per cent 
husband income and no capital income. 
14 from 52 to 60 and 65 years of age respectively. Cross-age effects although positive are relatively small, 
especially for males. 
Poor health influences strong and positively the exit rate from the labour market. For males a chronic 
health condition, to visit often the doctor and especially to be admitted as  in-patient at a hospital are 
good proxies for poor health. For women, the visits to the doctor do no reflect a poor health condition, as 
mentioned above.  Cross-spouse health effects are  mainly  insignificant with  an  interesting exception: 
when the wife is employed and the  husband is  not,  poor health (a chronic condition) of the husband 
reduces the wife's exit rate by 24 per cent compared to good health.
24  A close inspection of the data 
reveals that when the husband is out of the labour force because of health reasons (with a low level of 
benefits), the wife's work income becomes fundamental for sustaining the household. The positive effect of 
the dummy reflecting whether the husband receives any type of invalidity income reinforces that hypothesis. 
Although to be unemployed during the first  period has in  principle a negative and small effect, it 
turns  to  be positive when  the individual is  60 or older.  This  reflects  the prevalence of special early 
retirement  schemes  for  unemployed  individuals  from  the  age  of 60.  Finally  living  arrangements 
influence clearly the probability of retirement for both, males and females. When the couple depends on 
other family members the probability of retirement increases drastically, especially for husbands. Also, 
when they cohabit with some family member depending on them there is a reduction in the probability of 
withdrawing from the labour market. 
With  respect  to  the  rest  of the  variables,  self-employment,  high  education  and  individual  work 
income relative to household work income are disincentives to  retirement. A part time job during the 
first period or a high percentage of the household income coming from non-work sources accelerates the 
exit from the labour market. 
We turn now to the simulation for the probability of retiring when both spouses were working in the 
initial period (Table 8). There is a strong positive effect of age. Age not only affects own retirement but 
also  the  older the  husband  relatively  to  the  wife  the  more  likely  that  she retires  and  vice  versa.  In 
particular if the husband is  65  and the  wife is  60 the probability of both retiring increases from per 
thousand  to almost 50 per cent. It seems  therefore  that financial  incentives generated by the  Social 
Security system influences the joint retirement decisions: the members of the couple tend to postpone 
retirement until they are eligible for a pension?5 
Health status is other major determinant of retirement for working couples. However here we find an 
asymmetric effect between husbands and wives. While poor health of any the members of the couple 
increases  their  own  probability  of retirement,  especially  for  husbands,  poor  health  of the  husband 
increases also the probability of both retiring. For example if the husband has really poor health (he has 
24Blau  (1998)  and  Blau  and  Riphahn  (1999)  found  similar  cross-spouses  effects  for  the  US  and  Gennany 
respectively. 
25Hidedmann (1998) propose and estimate a model of Social Security  acceptance for working couples for the US 
and obtain similar results. 
15 a chronic condition, was admitted as in-patient in a hospital during the previous year and visits often the 
doctor) the probability of both members of the couple retiring increases from 1 per thousand to 5.5 per 
cent. However, the wife's health status effect on the probability of joint retirement is almost negligible. 
Therefore when the husband leaves the labour market due to health problems, the wife (because of care-
giving reasons) is more likely to leave also the labour market. Finally, the probability of both retiring 
also increases when both members of the couple enjoy poor health. 
Some  other  variables  as  the job status  at  the  initial  period  or the  relative  work income  present 
interesting asymmetric effects. When one member of the couple is unemployed at the initial period he or 
she is  more likely to retire. However when the husband is the unemployed one, also the wife tends to 
retire: there is a mild increase on the probability that she retires and a more important increase on the 
probability of both  retiring.  This is  coherent with  the  absence  of an  added  worker effect found  for 
several European countries.
26 The income effects go in the same direction. The higher the percentage of 
the household income any member of the couple earns, the less likely slbe is  to retire. However,  the 
husband income has a positive effect on the probability of retirement of his wife while the wife income 
has a negative effect on the probability of retirement of the husband. In any case, work income as well as 
non-work income act as  a disincentive to joint retirement. The negative sign of the non-work income 
variable may reflect stronger labour market attachment. 
The living arrangements of the couple show a clear example of co-ordinated behaviour: to depend on 
other family members increases the probability of observing both members of the couple out from the 
labour market. Self-employment of any of the spouses reduces the probability of observing any of them 
retiring, in line with the results in Tables 4 and 5. 
Potential experience of the husband increases his exit from the labour market and the probability of 
both of them retiring, while the wife's potential experience increases only the probability of both of them 
retiring. This effect reflects again the economic incentives of the pension system: when both of them are 
more likely to be eligible for a pension the chances of  joint retirement are higher. 
With respect to the country specific effects, Italy, France and Spain are the countries in which joint 
retirement is more likely to occur. The country specifie variables do not encompass well the differences 
between countries and further research should be done in this aspect. 
Before  concluding  it  is  worth  to  mention  that  the  effect  of most  variables  on  the  transition 
probabilities of any spouse depends on the job status of the other member of the couple. For example, a 
woman  with  strong health problems has  a probability of retiring of 6 per cent when  her husband is 
employed while it increases to 9.6 per cent when the husband is already retired. In the same way, the 
probability of a male retiring when his wife is working and he has strong health problems is lower than 1 
per cent but when his wife is already retired this probability increases to 28.2 per cent. Therefore there is 
evidence of a propensity among couples to spend leisure time together. Whether this effect is  due to 
16 some unobservable  characteristics affecting both  members  of the couple  or to  complementarities  in 
leisure is a question that can not be disentangled with the simple model estimated in the previous section. 
6. Conclusions 
In  this  paper we examine  individual  and  couples  retirement  patterns  within  the  EU12 using 
information from the first two waves (1994 and 1995) of the European Community Household Panel, a 
newly  released  Eurostat  longitudinal  Survey.  In  our  analysis  we  pool  the  data  from  the  different 
countries and control the differences between their labour markets and pension systems. In more detail, 
we control these differences by introducing either a set of country specific effects or a set of variables 
that capture the differences in the regulation and/or the characteristics of the popUlation. Our approach, 
despite  some  evident  limitations,  has  important  advantages:  it  permits,  specially  when  more  waves 
become available,  to  capture the effect of the  regulation  and to  analyse the effect of changes in the 
regulations for some countries. 
Before describing the detailed results we  want to  stress  that there is  strong evidence of joint 
retirement behaviour for the EU12 countries. In particular, we find that a working spouse is more likely 
to retire the more recently the other spouse has retired. This effect is even stronger if the wife is  the 
working spouse. 
At the individual level  our results  are  in  line with  most of the  recent literature in retirement 
behaviour.  In  particular,  we  find  some  behavioural  differences  (income  and  health  effects)  between 
males and females; the more the household depends on the male for survival the smaller his probability 
of retirement  is;  self-employed  people  have  lower probabilities  of leaving  the  labour force;  highly 
educated  individuals  stay  in  the  labour  market  for  longer  periods;  the  probability  of retirement  is 
important at early ages  and peaks  twice,  at  60 and  65.  Health  variables,  as  founded  in  other recent 
studies, are very relevant in determining retirement behaviour, especially for males. 
As expected, there are strong differences between countries, which are well accounted for by the 
differences  in  regulation,  specially  in  the  cases  of males.  For  females,  the  important  behavioural 
differences across countries (essentially the difference North vs South) are not well captured, because of 
our data limitations. 
With respect to couples exiting from the labour force, the following features should be stressed. 
First, concerning the joint retirement decisions given that both members of the couple are participants at 
the beginning of the period, we have found, first, strong cross age effects, specially when both spouses 
reach the entitlement age. Second, as found in other studies, there is strong evidence against the added 
worker effect at older ages. Third, male health status has strong influence in his own decision and, more 
importantly, in joint retirement decisions. However, the reverse is not true, since female health status has 
26Several theories try to explain this fact: complementarities in leisure, assortative matting, a stigma effect for 
husbands depending on their wives and so on. See Martfnez-Granado (1998) for an application using UK data. 
17 little influence in all the cases. This issue deserves further investigation since we believe that it  may 
undercover an important income effect. Fourth, as  previously commented, the self-employment status 
discourages retirement in  all cases. Finally, we find important asymmetric effects of the relative work 
income variables. 
To finalise, we want to emphasise that the magnitude of the effect of some key variables (health, 
income or living arrangements) depends on the labour force of both members of the couples suggesting 
either complementarities in leisure or correlation in the unobservables of both spouses. 
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20 Data Appendix 
A. Variables. 
The variables included in the analysis can be grouped in four categories: 








marital  status:  two  dummies,  one taking  value  1 if the  individual  is  married,  and  the  other 
equalling 1 if the individual is separated/divorced/widowed 
a dummy for the individual being head of the household, dated in to. 
a dummy  reflecting whether the couple lives as  dependent in  other households or any of the 
members is the head of the household and therefore they live independently, dated in to. 
age, its square, and two dummies, one for age being 60 and another for age being 65 to pick the 
exit spikes at those ages 
education: a dummy for the individual having a third level of education recognised 
foreigner: a dummy for individuals not being nationals of the country where they are, dated in to. 
household size, dated in to. 
*  number of children in the household younger than 15, dated in to. 





a dummy if the individual reports himself as having good health, dated in to. 
a dummy for individuals having a chronic physical or mental health problem, dated in  t] (this 
information is not available for to). 
a dummy for individual was admitted as in-patient in a hospital during the previous year 
two dummy variables for visiting the doctor between 1 and 5 times and more than five times in 
the year, dated in to. 
3)  labour force status characteristics, all dated in to. 






Dummies  controlling for  self-employment,  unemployment,  part-time job and,  working in  the 
public sector. 
Occupational dummies: professionals, clerks, services workers 
Dummy for the size of the job unit greater than 500 
Work  income  relative  to  household  income  (it  includes  employment  and  self-employment 
earnings as well as unemployment benefits). 
Non-work income relative to household income (includes capital and property rental income as 
well as private transfers) 
21 *  Invalidity  income:  dummy  that  equals  1  if the  individual  receives  income  from  sickness 
pensions. Since this type of income is not directly observable for every country it also includes 
some other public pensions: educational, family related benefits and other personal benefits. 
4)  Country specific characteristics 
*  11 national dummies 
*  sex specific variables collecting different regulations and characteristics across countries 
i)  life expectancy at 65: number of expected years to live over 65 
ii)  Early retirement age 
iii)  Normal retirement age 
iv)  Social Protection Expenditure (in Euro per capita) 
v)  Pension eligibility criteria 
vi)  Minimum pension relative to work income 
In Tables A.l and A.2 below present the mean and the standard deviation for all relevant variables in the 
individual and joint samples. 
Table At. Descriptive statistics 
Male sample  Female sample  Males  in  Females in 
Couples sample  Couples sample 
5032  Obs  4171  Obs.  4639  obs.  4639  Obs 
Mean  st-dev.  Mean  st-dev.  Mean  St-dev.  Mean  St-dev. 
Transition to retirement  0.173  0.379  0.168  0.374  0.183(*)  0.387  0.197(#)  0.398 
Age  60.28  4.826  56.07  5.270  60.99  5.000  57.61  5.181 
Unemployment  0.093  0.291  0.086  0.281  0.073  0.260  0.038  0.192 
College education  0.158  0.365  0.136  0.343  0.147  0.354  0.073  0.260 
Good Health  0.599  0.490  0.569  0.495  0.555  0.497  0.509  0.500 
Chronic physical/mental health problems  0.244  0.430  0.244  0.430  0.287  0.452  0.279  0.449 
In-patient in a hospital  0.098  0.297  0.082  0.274  0.104  0.305  0.091  0.288 
Number of visits to the doctor 1-5  0.563  0.496  0.551  0.497  0.545  0.498  0.530  0.499 
Number of visits to the doctor >=6  0.225  0.417  0.322  0.467  0.265  0.441  0.340  0.474 
Potential experience  42.38  9.692  35.44  12.11  43.57  9.126  31.82  17.73 
Self employment status  0.379  0.485  0.200  0.400  0.330  0.470  0.111  0.314 
Part time  0.070  0.255  0.240  0.427  0.067  0.250  0.185  0.389 
Public employment  0.216  0.412  0.310  0.463  0.219  0.413  0.162  0.368 
Working in a 500+ firm  0.093  0.291  0.070  0.255  0.106  0.308  0.047  0.212 
Professional  0.259  0.438  0.270  0.444  0.257  0.435  0.139  0.346 
Clerks  0.054  0.227  0.138  0.345  0.056  0.230  0.076  0.266 
Services workers  0.053  0.224  0.158  0.365  0.052  0.223  0.103  0.304 
Non national  0.015  0.122  0.017  0.128  0.011  0.103  0.011  0.103 
Married  0.876  0.330  0.728  0.445 
Sep-divorced-Widowing  0.061  0.240  0.203  0.403 
Household size  3.083  1.464  2.682  1.303  3.091  1.351  3.091  1.351 
Living independently  0.936  0.245  0.936  0.245 
Number of children 0-15  0.113  0.447  0.079  0.358  0.080  0.371  0.080  0.371 
Head  0.913  0.282  0.444  0.497 
Work income relative to H'hold income  0.581  0.320  0.368  0.308  0.473  0.356  0.136  0.219 
Non-work income reI. To H'hold income  0.027  0.085  0.017  0.067  0.036  0.105  0.036  0.105 
Min benefits relative to  work income  0.501  0.378  0.658  0.348  0.527  0.373  0.837  0.291 
Notes: (*) Over 3881 observations. (#) Over 2207 observations. 
22 Table A2. Analysis of  joint transitions within the couples. 
[Sample Husband Aged 55+ Wife 50+. Retirement is assumed to be an absorbing state.] 
To  Both in  Husband inl  Husb.Outl  Both out 
From  Wife out  wife in 
Both in  1035  175  117  66 
(74.3)  (12.6)  (8.4)  (4.74) 
Husband In I wife out  n.c.  1861  nc  514 
(78.4)  (21.64) 
Husband Out I wife in  n.c.  n.c.  575  183 
(75.9)  (24.1) 
Both out  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c 
Notes: (ne): not considered. 
B. Social Protection expenditures and  pension systems in EU12 (1994-1995). 
Social protection expenditure (SPE), which include a large variety of programs or functions  (old-age, 
survivor, disability, unemployment, etc  .. ) represents a major part of public spending in all EU countries. 
Overall,  in  1995,  SPE  amounted  to  28.4  percent  of GDP  and  52.2  percent  of total  government 
expenditures in the EU. As a share of GDP, SPE is highest in Central and Nordic countries (above 30 per 
cent) and lowest in the Southern countries and Ireland (around 20 percent). The level of SPE per capita 
(measured in PPP units) also varies (practically proportionally to GDP per capita levels) between the two 
groups of countries mentioned (from under 2.500 PPP in Greece and Portugal and about 3.000 PPP in 
Spain and Ireland, to over 6.000 in Denmark, Luxembourg). The last two columns of Table A3 report the 
ratio of old age and survivors pension expenditures to  SPE and  to  GDP.  Excluding Greece,  pension 
expenditures in 1995 amounted on average to 42.4 percent of SPE and 12.1 percent of GDP. In all EU12 
countries,  except  Ireland  (which  has  the  lowest  fraction  of elderly  people),  old-age  and  survivors 
pensions represent by far the largest component of SPE, ranging from 35.5 percent in Netherlands to 63 
percent in Italy (the country with the largest proportion of retired people). 
Table A3. Social protection expenditures in the EU, 1995 
SPE  SPEp.c.  Pension Expenditures 
Coun!!2:  %GDP  PPP'OOO  %SPE  %GDP 
Germany  30.4  5.8  40.8  12.0 
Denmark  34.3  6.3  36.6  12.6 
Netherlands  31.6  5.8  35.5  11.2 
Belgium  29.7  5.6  39.8  11.8 
Luxembourg  25.3  7.7  43.2  10.9 
France  30.6  5.5  40.7  12.5 
UK  28.5  4.5  38.0  10.4 
Ireland  19.9  3.2  24.9  5.0 
Italy  24.6  4.1  62.7  15.4 
Greece  21.0  2.3  n.a.  n.a. 
Spain  21.8  2.9  44.1  9.6 
Portu~al  20.7  2.4  38.6  8.0 
EU15  28.4  4.8  42.4  12.1 
Notes: SPE: Social Protection Expenditures. In thousands per capita. 
Pensions expenditures: Old-age + Survivor functions. Source: Boldrin et al. (1999). 
23 The pension system and its generosity 
There are two key types of pension systems: unfounded Pay As You Go (PA  YG) and funded systems. 
All the EU12 are characterised by a first PAYG pillar, which differs across countries in their coverage 
and generosity.  Simultaneously, on  the  top  of this  public first pillar,  many  EU countries have also  a 
second pension pillar (voluntary or compulsory), with defined benefits (DB)  or defined contributions 
(DC).  On the top of these two pillars, there is a third private pensions pillar (which is  still of limited 
importance in a vast majority of the countries considered). See, for instance, Boldrin et al (1999) for a 
comprehensive description of the EU15 situation. 
In Table A4  a set of variables  that identify  some  of the  differences  in  terms  of the  parameters that 
characterise public pensions and life expectancy (which determines the length of the period in which 
people receives benefits) in EU12 countries.27  There are not much differences in retirement ages (being 
Italy an important exception) or life expectancy (either at birth or at 65). However, there are important 
differences  among  countries  in  contributory  rates,  eligibility  criteria  and  generosity.  It  is  worth 
mentioning the differences in generosity of the "guaranteed" benefits. Belgium and Luxembourg provide 
the elderly with the  highest level of guaranteed benefits and Greece, Portugal and Germany with the 
lowest.  A clear relationship  between the  levels  of guaranteed benefits  and  GDP per capita is  found 
(Germany and Spain are notable exceptions). See Boldrin et al. (1999) or Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) 
for further comments of public pension replacement rates or generosity. 
Table A4. Country data in 1994-1995. 
Country  Tax  SPE  Male  Female  Male life  Fern. Life  Early  Normal  Elegi- Minimum 
Euro EC.  Life eXE.  Life eXE.  eXE at 65  eXE at 65  (F)  (F)  bilit~  Benefits 
Germany  42.6  5514  73  80  14.7  18.4  63  65  5  2768 
Denmark  51.3  6374  73  78  14.3  17.7  60  67  3  3472 
Netherlands  45.4  5536  75  80  14.8  19.1  65  65  0  3473 
Belgium  46.8  5052  74  81  14.8  19.1  65  60  0  7638 
Luxembourg  43.3  6674  74  81  14.6  18.7  60  65·  10  10440 
France  44.6  5500  74  82  16.2  20.6  60  60  0  5048 
UK  34.9  4649  74  79  14.7  18.3  65(60)  65(60)  4  4103 
Ireland  36.3  2873  73  79  13.9  17.4  65  65  3  3357 
Italy  40.7  4312  75  81  15.5  19.4  56(51)  61(56)  16  4759 
Greece  32.8  1645  75  80  16.1  18.4  60  65(60)  15  354 
Spain  34.8  3020  73  81  15.7  19.5  60  65  10  5087 
Portusal  36.1  2162  71  79  14.4  17.9  60  65(62)  15  1345 
Keys:  Tax: Income and social contributions taxation. SPE: Social protection expenditure (in Euro per capita). 
Minimum benefits are given in 1995 PPS units. 
27The key parameters that characterise public pension systems are the contribution rates, the eligibility criteria, the 
early (if any) and normal retirement ages, the replacement rate, the indexation rules (to real wages or to nominal 
inflation), and the amount of  survivors and orphans benefits. 
24 Table A.S. Transition to joint retirement from Husband in I Wife out of the LF 
Variable  Coef  St-dev  Coef  St-dev 
Male age  0.168  0.060  0.160  0.059 
Male age-sq  -0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.002 
Female age  0.038  0.046  0.042  0.046 
Female age-sq  -0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.002 
Age 60 (male)  0.643  0.175  0.639  0.174 
Age 65 (male)  1.408  0.244  1.418  0.244 
Male unemployment  -0.284  0.310  -0.335  0.325 
Male unemployment and Age >=60  1.211  0.376  1.221  0.374 
Female college education  -0.743  0.325  -0.794  0.324 
Male College education  -0.013  0.195  0.002  0.195 
Male pot. Experience  0.001  0.008  0.000  0.008 
Male part time  0.622  0.203  0.570  0.202 
Male working in PS  0.263  0.152  0.259  0.152 
Male self-employed  -0.432  0.158  -0.439  0.157 
Household Size  -0.249  0.060  -0.244  0.058 
Independent  -1.914  0.203  -1.773  0.189 
Male Good Health  0.110  0.140  0.088  0.139 
Male Chronic physical/mental problems  0.451  0.142  0.447  0.142 
Male as in-patient in hospital  1.000  0.174  1.001  0.174 
Male 1-5 visits to a doctor  0.175  0.166  0.164  0.165 
Male 6+ visits  to a doctor  0.271  0.204  0.279  0.202 
Female Good Health  -0.254  0.142  -0.270  0.140 
Female Chronic physical/mental problems  -0.106  0.248  -0.084  0.247 
Female as in-patient in hospital  0.123  0.190  0.101  0.189 
Male Work income rei to H'hold income  -0.787  0.420  -0.734  0.430 
Couple non-work priv inc. reI. to H'hold inc.  -1.600  0.572  -1.618  0.569 
Female chronic problem X Male rei income  -0.033  0.377  -0.068  0.376 
Female Age X Male reI. income  -0.026  0.033  -0.027  0.033 
Fel!!.~le receiving invalidity inc0'.!l~ ________  -=-0.I~L  ___ ~}89  -0.153  0.190 
Female life expo at 65  0.537  0.188 
Male Life expo at 65  -0.284  0.194 
Early retirement age  -0.043  0.027 
Normal retirement age  -0.100  0.046 
Social Prot. Exp. (in Euro per capita)  0.000  0.000 
Male min benefits reI. To work income  0.072  0.279  ------------------- --
Denmark  -0.816  0.440 
Belgium  -0.456  0.363 
France  0.744  0.311 
UK  -0.485  0.306 
Ireland  -0.801  0.311 
Italy  0.383  0.266 
Greece  0.102  0.278 
Spain  -0.348  0.265 
Portugal  -0.483  0.276 
Intercept  -0.643  0.748  4.793  4.551 
Observations  2361 
Log-L  -941.4  -944.8 
Pseudo-R_sq  23.43  23.15 
Chi-sq  576.0 (38)  569.1 (35) 
Omitted Countries (Germany+Lux) 
25 Table A.6. Transition to joint retirement from Husband out I Wife in the LF 
Variable  Coef.  St-dev  Coef.  St-dev 
Male age  0.133  0.096  0.126  0.095 
Male age-sq  -0.003  0.002  -0.003  0.002 
Female age  0.068  0.090  0.059  0.090 
Female age-sq  0.002  0.004  0.003  0.004 
Age 60 (female)  1.523  0.330  1.522  0.326 
Age 65 (female)  1.233  0.494  1.142  0.472 
Female unemployment  -0.295  0.464  -0.334  0.468 
Female unemployment and Age >=60  0.845  0.684  0.786  0.678 
Female college education  -0.138  0.484  -0.092  0.485 
Male College education  0.221  0.385  0.307  0.378 
Female pot. Experience  0.019  0.009  0.020  0.009 
Female part time  0.338  0.232  0.364  0.234 
Female working in PS  -0.339  0.291  -0.394  0.293 
Female self-employed  -0.401  0.277  -0.463  0.272 
Household Size  -0.099  0.106  -0.096  0.104 
Independent  -1.367  0.400  -1.298  0.377 
Male Good Health  -0.312  0.256  -0.318  0.252 
Male Chronic physical/mental problems  -0.588  0.358  -0.577  0.354 
Male as in-patient in hospital  0.284  0.295  0.276  0.296 
Female Good Health  -0.201  0.243  -0.203  0.238 
Female Chronic physical/mental problems  0.490  0.267  0.600  0.259 
Female as in-patient in hospital  1.277  0.401  1.240  0.401 
Female 1-5 visits to a doctor  -0.299  0.318  -0.338  0.313 
Female 6+ visits  to a doctor  -0.446  0.357  -0.437  0.352 
Female Work income reI to H'hold income  -2.547  1.489  -2.667  1.536 
Couple non-work priv inc. reI. to H'hold income  0.828  1.343  0.976  1.326 
Male chronic problem X Female reI income  0.373  0.883  0.404  0.879 
Male Age X Female reI. income  0.085  0.077  0.082  0.076 
Male receivil!S invaliditxJE..~~me  0.499  0.316  0.602  0.304 
Female life expo at 65  0.723  0.348 
Male Life expo at 65  -0.286  0.273 
Early retirement age  -0.031  0.043 
Normal retirement age  -0.045  0.050 
Social Prot. Exp. (in Euro per capita)  0.000  0.000 
Female min benefits reI. to work income  -0.076  0.507 
Denmark  -0.765  0.618 
Belgium  -0.720  0.702 
France  0.404  0.432 
UK  0.591  0.504 
Ireland  -1.331  0.948 
Italy  0.536  0.472 
Greece  0.432  0.487 
Spain  0.038  0.464 
Portugal  -0.707  0.501 
Interceet  -2.089  1.212  -3.602  4.435 
Observations  758 
Log-L  -310.8  -313.8 
Pseudo-R_sq  25.8  25.1 
Chi-s9  216.2 (38)  210.3 (35) 
Omitted Countries (Germany+Lux) 
26 Table A.7a. Transitions to retirement from the labour force. A 4-state model. 
Husb. 1nl Wife out  Husb out! Wife in  Both of them out 
Variable  Coef.  St-dev  Coef.  St-dev  Coef.  St-dev 
Male age  0.071  0.099  0.043  0.121  0.287  0.192 
Male age-sq  -0.003  0.003  0.000  0.004  -0.006  0.005 
Female age  0.134  0.084  0.044  0.096  0.126  0.139 
Female age-sq  0.000  0.003  -0.002  0.004  -0.002  0.004 
Age 60 (male)  -0.135  0.322  0.876  0.326  0.452  0.585 
Age 60 (female)  -0.409  0.550  1.853  0.433  1.427  0.601 
Age 65 (male)  1.055  0.346  -0.085  0.508  1.611  0.482 
Age 65 (female)  0.556  0.729  0.391  0.807  -0.590  1.192 
Male unemployment  0.251  0.388  0.575  0.407  1.029  0.661 
Female unemployment  1.019  0.322  -0.032  0.443  0.089  0.702 
Male college education  0.163  0.314  -0.551  0.393  -0.479  0.715 
Female college education  -0.376  0.423  -0.279  0.442  0.454  0.769 
Female potential experience  -0.006  0.011  0.003  0.013  0.028  0.026 
Male potential experience  0.004  0.018  0.032  0.018  -0.003  0.022 
Female part time  0.852  0.206  0.274  0.251  0.481  0.388 
Male part time  -0.459  0.405  0.447  0.374  -0.102  0.541 
Female working in PS  -0.150  0.292  0.378  0.287  0.075  0.509 
Male working in PS  -0.506  0.309  0.661  0.296  0.201  0.538 
Any of them self-employed  -0.403  0.253  -0.205  0.308  -1.094  0.464 
Household Size  -0.010  0.092  -0.067  0.120  -0.645  0.201 
Independent  -0.158  0.763  -0.520  0.793  -3.909  0.806 
Male Good Health  0.082  0.222  -0.310  0.261  -0.392  0.419 
Male Chronic physical/mental problems  -0.331  0.361  1.222  0.382  0.559  0.515 
Male as in-patient in hospital  0.318  0.348  0.492  0.351  1.429  0.458 
Male 1-5 visits to a doctor  0.171  0.246  0.662  0.359  0.645  0.561 
Male 6+ visits  to a doctor  -0.184  0.344  0.881  0.424  0.707  0.671 
Female Good Health  0.135  0.223  0.373  0.276  -0.194  0.410 
Female Chronic physical/mental problems  1.326  0.456  1.084  0.549  -1.641  0.968 
Female as in-patient in hospital  -0.333  0.372  -0.090  0.444  0.760  0.574 
Female 1-5 visits to a doctor  -0.042  0.279  -0.168  0.340  -1.100  0.481 
Female 6+ visits to a doctor  0.066  0.328  -0.608  0.406  -1.452  0.571 
Both chronic condition  -0.845  0.480  -1.276  0.505  -0.021  0.822 
Female Work income relative to H'hold income  -4.607  1.551  -2.090  1.606  -2.399  3.246 
Male Work income relative to H'hold income  0.917  0.739  -0.575  0.979  -4.969  1.676 
Couple non-work priv. inc. reI. to H'hold income  -0.661  1.009  -1.528  1.523  -3.793  2.454 
Male Age X Female relative income  0.192  0.114  0.170  0.108  -0.236  0.242 
Female Age X Male relative income  -0.062  0.067  0.016  0.089  0.201  0.124 
Male chronic problem X Female reI income  2.104  1.054  -0.855  1.009  2.321  1.713 
Female chronic ~roblem  X Male reI income  -0.924  0.662  -0.151  0.872  3.048  1.369 
Denmark  -0.846  0.512  0.088  0.544  -0.012  1.175 
Belgium  -0.225  0.705  0.835  0.806  -0.501  1.249 
France  -1.434  0.702  1.764  0.516  2.400  1.001 
UK  0.124  0.406  0.347  0.503  1.007  0.950 
Ireland  1.236  0.473  -0.317  0.888  1.391  1.243 
Italy  1.286  0.427  1.436  0.529  2.222  0.997 
Greece  0.810  0.418  0.598  0.574  1.321  1.008 
Spain  0.670  0.472  -0.495  0.782  1.633  1.091 
Portugal  -0.231  0.425  0.045  0.536  -0.295  1.019 
InterceEt  -3.474  1.469  -5.262  1.756  -0.331  2.557 
Observations  1393 
Log-L  -870.6 
Pseudo-R_sq  25.1 
Chi-s9  582.0 (144) 
Omitted Countries (Germany+Lux); Omitted state: 
Both members working 
27 Table A.7b. Transitions to retirement from the labour force: A 4-state model. 
Husb. 1nl Wife out  Husb out! Wife in  Both of them out 
Variable  Coef.  St-dev  Coef.  St-dev  Coef.  St-dev 
Male age  0.051  0.097  0.050  0.122  0.304  0.190 
Male age-sq  -0.002  0.003  0.000  0.004  -0.006  0.005 
Female age  0.092  0.083  0.045  0.096  0.127  0.139 
Female age-sq  0.000  0.003  -0.002  0.004  -0.003  0.004 
Age 60 (male)  -0.099  0.319  0.869  0.324  0.510  0.569 
Age 60 (female)  -0.252  0.546  1.911  0.430  1.660  0.594 
Age 65 (male)  1.052  0.338  -0.085  0.507  1.547  0.474 
Age 65 (female)  0.372  0.703  0.595  0.818  -0.860  1.192 
Male unemployment  0.166  0.397  0.647  0.431  0.693  0.683 
Female unemployment  0.495  0.314  -0.119  0.452  0.026  0.706 
Male college education  0.297  0.309  -0.572  0.388  -0.495  0.708 
Female college education  -0.220  0.414  -0.298  0.439  0.475  0.777 
Female potential experience  -0.013  0.010  0.003  0.013  0.022  0.024 
Male potential experience  0.014  0.015  0.032  0.019  -0.005  0.021 
Female part time  0.794  0.202  0.261  0.253  0.547  0.391 
Male part time  -0.359  0.406  0.480  0.374  -0.017  0.535 
Female working in PS  -0.111  0.287  0.437  0.287  0.143  0.501 
Male working in PS  -0.449  0.302  0.649  0.295  0.058  0.523 
Any of them self-employed  -0.483  0.254  -0.257  0.314  -1.187  0.447 
H'old Size  0.115  0.087  -0.101  0.122  -0.560  0.194 
Independent  0.133  0.692  -0.162  0.673  -3.011  0.637 
Male Good Health  0.082  0.219  -0.287  0.259  -0.260  0.418 
Male Chronic physical/mental problems  -0.308  0.348  1.186  0.382  0.562  0.512 
Male as in-patient in hospital  0.363  0.345  0.465  0.347  1.433  0.452 
Male 1-5 visits to a doctor  0.157  0.243  0.679  0.357  0.703  0.551 
Male 6+ visits  to a doctor  -0.203  0.340  0.896  0.421  0.747  0.669 
Female Good Health  0.176  0.221  0.371  0.272  -0.139  0.413 
Female Chronic physical/mental problems  1.231  0.449  1.115  0.549  -1.530  0.938 
Female as in-patient in hospital  -0.089  0.361  -0.142  0.442  0.883  0.572 
Female 1-5 visits to a doctor  -0.019  0.278  -0.152  0.334  -1.032  0.473 
Female 6+ visits  to a doctor  0.084  0.327  -0.627  0.401  -1.471  0.568 
Both chronic condition  -0.785  0.476  -1.276  0.504  -0.126  0.801 
Female Work income relative to H'hold income  -3.678  1.569  -1.544  1.641  -3.000  3.363 
Male Work income relative to H'hold income  0.668  0.743  -1.004  1.043  -5.066  1.743 
Couple non-work priv. income reI. to H'hold inc.  -0.712  0.991  -1.664  1.512  -4.063  2.480 
Male Age X Female relative income  0.216  0.111  0.172  0.109  -0.222  0.238 
Female Age X Male relative income  -0.013  0.066  0.011  0.091  0.242  0.121 
Male chronic problem X Female relative income  2.045  1.001  -0.816  0.994  2.060  1.699 
Female chronic Eroblem X Male relative income  -0.919  0.658  -0.153  0.878  3.147  1.362 
Female life expo at 65  0.435 .  0.275  0.491  0.406  0.777  0.530 
Male Life expo at 65  -0.615  0.352  -0.411  0.470  0.310  0.611 
Early retirement age  -0.021  0.042  -0.032  0.049  -0.027  0.079 
Normal retirement age  -0.163  0.091  -0.291  0.116  -0.008  0.153 
Social Protection Expenditure (in Euro per capita)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
min benefits reI. to female work income  0.103  0.444  -0.660  0.610  0.546  0.833 
min benefits reI. to male work income  1.273  0.502  0.777  0.594  -0.824  0.986 
Interce£t  12.163  9.531  15.041  11.704  -15.668  16.495 
Observations  1393 
Log-L  -890.5 
Pseudo-R_sq  23.3 
Chi-s9  542.1 (138) 
Omitted Countries (Germany+Lux); Omitted state: 
Both members working 
28 Table 4. Male. Individual transition to retirement 
Variable  Coef  St-dev  Coef  St-dev  Coef  St-dev 
head  -1.445  0.130  -1.442  0.130  -1.369  0.148 
married  0.290  0.188  0.263  0.187  0.263  0.232 
Separated-di  vorced-widowed  0.407  0.237  0.392  0.236  0.468  0.293 
Age  0.275  0.037  0.273  0.036  0.193  0.055 
Age-sq  -0.004  0.001  -0.004  0.001  -0.001  0.002 
Age 60  0.808  0.128  0.813  0.127  0.946  0.149 
Age 65  1.469  0.182  1.484  0.182  1.789  0.253 
Unemployment  0.229  0.147  0.248  0.157  0.352  0.155 
High education  -0.375  0.146  -0.361  0.145  -0.435  0.172 
Good Health  -0.089  0.099  -0.073  0.099  0.010  0.125 
Chronic physical/mental health problem  0.563  0.100  0.551  0.100  0.707  0.126 
In-patient at a hospital  0.647  0.128  0.660  0.128  0.492  0.161 
1-5 visits to a doctor  0.139  0.123  0.154  0.122  0.143  0.158 
6+ visits  to a doctor  0.345  0.148  0.363  0.148  0.306  0.187 
Potential experience  0.011  0.006  0.010  0.006  0.007  0.008 
Self employment status  -0.389  0.120  -0.363  0.118 
Part time  0.686  0.144  0.674  0.144  0.356  0.207 
Public employment  0.467  0.123  0.467  0.123  0.481  0.130 
Working in a 500+ firm  0.785  0.150  0.763  0.149  0.821  0.157 
Professional  0.080  0.120  0.076  0.120  0.223  0.153 
Clerks  0.188  0.190  0.197  0.190  0.235  0.197 
Services workers  -0.690  0.235  -0.676  0.234  -0.671  0.286 
Non national  -0.983  0.447  -0.936  0.445  -1.621  0.567 
Household size  -0.208  0.045  -0.188  0.043  -0.232  0.058 
Number of children 0-15  0.234  0.119  0.206  0.117  0.401  0.134 
Work income relative to H'hold income  -0.812  0.156  -0.735  0.172  -0.802  0.212 
Non-wor~private income relative  -1.414  0.548  -1.385  0.547  -1.208  0.810  --------------
Life expo At 65  0.522  0.086 
Male early retirement age  0.053  0.037 
Female normal retirement age  -0.105  0.029 
Social Prot. Exp. (in Euro per capita)  0.000  0.000 
Pension elegibility criteria  0.056  0.020 
Minimum benefits reI. to work income  0.044  0.171  ---------------
Denmark  -0.368  0.249  -0.502  0.289 
Belgium  0.673  0.252  0.672  0.285 
Luxembourg  1.194  0.453  1.620  0.510 
France  0.861  0.229  0.855  0.254 
UK  -0.097  0.212  -0.084  0.238 
Ireland  -0.599  0.248  0.147  0.291 
Italy  1.056  0.203  1.276  0.235 
Greece  0.663  0.211  0.492  0.280 
Spain  0.427  0.205  0.353  0.235 
Portugal  -0.305  0.213  -0.093  0.253 
Intercept  -3.556  0.468  -8.886  3.891  -3.161  0.591 
Observations  5032  5032  3123 
Log-L  -1782.2  -1786.5  -1141.3 
Pseudo-R_sq  23.2  23.1  24.2 
Chi-sq  1079.0 (37)  1070.3 (33)  730.0 (36) 
Omitted: Germany Excluded: Nether. 
29 Table 5. Female. Individual transition to retirement 
Variable  Coef  St-dev  Coef  St-dev  Coef  St-dev 
Head  -0.766  0.123  -0.740  0.122  -0.816  0.148 
married  -0.501  0.209  -0.494  0.206  -0.728  0.234 
Separated-di  vorced-widowed  -0.222  0.210  -0.181  0.207  -0.460  0.236 
Age  0.140  0.025  0.144  0.024  0.107  0.033 
Age-sq  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
Age 60  1.285  0.166  1.169  0.162  1.401  0.188 
Age 65  0.855  0.284  0.843  0.278  1.267  0.456 
Unemployment  0.553  0.155  0.439  0.155  0.612  0.160 
High education  -0.145  0.184  -0.103  0.182  -0.123  0.200 
Good Health  -0.205  0.107  -0.077  0.104  -0.314  0.124 
Chronic physicaVmental health problem  0.229  0.113  0.217  0.110  0.224  0.130 
In-patient at a hospital  0.169  0.169  0.268  0.165  0.280  0.190 
1-5 visits to a doctor  -0.201  0.141  -0.167  0.139  -0.343  0.163 
6+ visits  to a doctor  -0.139  0.161  -0.083  0.158  -0.415  0.187 
Potential experience  0.006  0.005  0.002  0.004  0.008  0.006 
Self employment status  -0.300  0.129  -0.319  0.126 
Part time  0.431  0.106  0.416  0.105  0.432  0.120 
Public employment  -0.293  0.133  -0.341  0.130  -0.361  0.142 
Working in a 500+ firm  0.165  0.188  0.137  0.185  0.122  0.194 
Professional  -0.225  0.145  -0.142  0.144  -0.091  0.174 
Clerks  -0.274  0.161  -0.199  0.160  -0.247  0.170 
Services workers  -0.425  0.145  -0.408  0.142  -0.315  0.160 
Non national  -0.203  0.401  0.058  0.390  -0.418  0.454 
Household size  -0.140  0.053  -0.079  0.050  -0.133  0.063 
Number of children 0-15  0.302  0.142  0.176  0.139  0.276  0.175 
Work income relative to H'hold income  -0.866  0.206  -0.620  0.230  -0.736  0.252 
Non-work Qrivate income relative  -1.691  0.837  -1.594  0.818  -1.948  1.093 
Life expo At 65  0.051  0.073 
Female early retirement age  -0.028  0.036 
Female normal retirement age  -0.049  0.024 
Social Prot. Exp. (in Euro per capita)  0.000  0.000 
Pension elegibility criteria  -0.017  0.026 
Minimum benefits reI. to work income  0.328  0.193  -
Denmark  -0.210  0.266  -0.290  0.281 
Belgium  0.662  0.265  0.697  0.279 
Luxembourg  1.314  0.451  .1.214  0.498 
France  0.200  0.222  0.133  0.233 
UK  0.491  0.218  0.460  0.227 
Ireland  0.760  0.279  0.755  0.305 
Italy  1.066  0.224  1.000  0.242 
Greece  0.864  0.222  0.708  0.251 
Spain  0.632  0.234  0.559  0.260 
Portugal  -0.492  0.231  -0.772  0.266 
cons  -1.760  0.402  2.469  3.253  -1.332  0.464 
Observations  4171  4171  3353 
Log-L  -1527.9  -1567.1  -1168.2 
Pseudo-R_sq  19.1  17.0  20.1 
Chi-59  721.5 (37)  643.2 (33)  610.8 (36) 
Omitted: Germany Excluded: Nether. 
30 Table 6.  Marginal Effect in Husband Retiring when the wife is already out of the labour force 
Prob.  Effect (%) 
Reference  0.072 
Husband Age = 60  0.233  222 
Husband Age = 65  0.554  664 
Wife Age =60  0.079  10 
Wife Age =65  0.080  10 
Husband Chronic Condition  0.099  37 
Husband in-patient at hospital  0.160  121 
Husband visiting doctor >=5  0.084  16 
Previous Three  0.282  289 
Wife Chronic Condition  0.082  13 
Wife in-patient at hospital  0.102  41 
H. work history started at 28  0.072  -1 
Husband Unemployed at to  0.056  -23 
H. Unemployed and Age 62  0.345  376 
Husband Higher Education  0.072  -1 
Wife Higher Education  0.036  -51 
Husband Part Time  0.127  75 
Husband Public Sector  0.092  27 
Husband Self-employed  0.048  -33 
Household size = 4  0.045  -37 
Not independent  0.346  378 
H. relative income = 75%  0.059  -18 
H. relative income = 25%  0.088  22 
H. relative income = 0%  0.108  48 
Couple relative non-work income = 10%  0.108  48 
Wife receiving invalidity income  0.063  -13 
Denmark  0.033  -54 
Belgium  0.047  -35 
France  0.141  95 
UK  0.046  -37 
Ireland  0.034  -53 
Italy  0.103  42 
Greece  0.080  10 
Spain  0.052  -28 
Portugal  0.046  -37 
Note:  the reference couple has the following characteristics: husband 55 years old and wife 52, none of them 
with higher education, none unemployed in the initial period, both starting their working Iifes at 18,  with no 
part-time job, none working in the public sector, none self-employed, living independently and without any other 
family  member.  The shares  of the household  income  for  the reference  couple  are: 25%  wife  income,  50% 
husband income and no capital income. 
31 Table 7.  Marginal Effect in Wife Retiring when the husband is already out of the labour force 
Reference 
Husband Age =  60 
Husband Age =  65 
Wife Age =60 
Wife Age =65 
Husband Chronic Condition 
Husband in-patient at hospital 
Wife Chronic Condition 
Wife in-patient at hospital 
Wife visiting doctor >=5 
Previous Three 
Wife work history started at 28 
Wife Unemployed at to 
Wife Unemployed and aged 62 
Husband Higher Education 
Wife Higher Education 
Wife Part Time 
Wife Public Sector 
Wife Self-employed 
Household size =  4 
Not independent 
W. relative income =  75% 
W. relative income = 50% 
W. relative income =  0% 
Couple relative non-work income =  10% 
















































































Note:  the reference couple has  the following characteristics: husband 55 years old and wife 52, none of them 
with higher education, none unemployed in the initial period, both starting their working lifes at 18,  with no 
part-time job, none working in the public sector, none self-employed, living independently and without any other 
family  member.  The shares of the  household  income  for  the reference couple are: 25%  wife  income,  50% 
husband income and no capital income. 
32 Table 8. Marginal effect for transitions from both working 
Wife  Husband Retiring  Both  Both 
Retiring  Retiring  working 
Prob.  Effect  Prob.  Effect  Prob.  Effect  Prob.  Effect 
(%)  (%)  (%)  (%) 
Reference  0.0377  0.0087  0.0014  0.9522 
Husband Age = 60  0.0478  26.7  0.0381  340.2  0.0042  197.4  0.9099  -4.4 
Husband Age = 65  0.0457  21.1  0.1880  2070.1  0.0157  1020.6  0.7506  -21.2 
Wife Age =60  0.2430  544.3  0.0097  12.3  0.0425  2929.3  0.7048  -26.0 
Wife Age =65  0.2478  557.2  0.0155  78.6  0.0126  800.6  0.7241  -24.0 
Husband 65 and Wife 60  0.2942  680.2  0.2112  2337.9  0.4765  33847.1  0.0181  -98.1 
Husband Chronic Condition  0.0422  11.9  0.0324  273.6  0.0065  362.3  0.9189  -3.5 
Husband in-patient at hospital  0.0477  26.5  0.0193  123.0  0.0087  517.7  0.9243  -2.9 
Husband visiting doctor >=5  0.0289  -23.3  0.0285  229.0  0.0042  200.0  0.9384  -1.5 
Previous Three  0.0483  28.0  0.1278  1375.0  0.0549  3813.8  0.7690  -19.2 
Wife Chronic Condition  0.0781  107.2  0.0164  88.7  0.0015  8.0  0.9040  -5.1 
Wife in-patient at hospital  0.0236  -37.4  0.0055  -37.1  0.0036  159.7  0.9673  1.6 
Wife visiting doctor >=5  0.0352  -6.7  0.0032  -62.5  0.0004  -71.6  0.9612  0.9 
Previous Three  0.0598  58.6  0.0081  -6.1  0.0008  -45.9  0.9313  -2.2 
Both Chronic condition  0.0375  -0.4  0.0171  96.8  0.0069  388.6  0.9385  -1.4 
H. work history started at 28  0.0361  -4.3  0.0123  42.5  0.0070  401.1  0.9445  -0.8 
Wife work history started at 28  0.0398  5.7  0.0165  90.4  0.0052  269.2  0.9385  -1.4 
Husband Unemployed at to  0.0485  28.6  0.0154  77.7  0.0039  179.8  0.9322  -2.1 
Wife Unemployed at to  0.1045  177.1  0.0084  -3.1  0.0015  9.3  0.8856  -7.0 
Both Unemployed  0.1343  256.2  0.0149  72.1  0.0043  205.8  0.8465  -11.1 
Husband Higher Education  0.0444  17.7  0.0050  -42.3  0.0009  -38.1  0.9497  -0.3 
Wife Higher Education  0.0259  -31.3  0.0066  -24.4  0.0022  57.4  0.9653  1.4 
Both Higher Education  0.0305  -19.2  0.0038  -56.4  0.0014  -2.5  0.9644  1.3 
Husband Part Time  0.0238  -36.8  0.0135  56.3  0.0013  -9.7  0.9614  1.0 
Wife Part Time  0.0884  134.4  0.0114  31.5  0.0023  61.7  0.8979  -5.7 
Both Part Time  0.0558  48.1  0.0178  105.6  0.0020  46.0  0.9243  -2.9 
Husband Public Sector  0.0227  -39.7  0.0168  93.7  0.0017  22.3  0.9588  0.7 
Wife Public Sector  0.0324  -14.0  0.0126  45.9  0.0015  7.8  0.9534  0.1 
Any Self-employed  0.0252  -33.2  0.0071  -18.5  0.0005  -66.5  0.9673  1.6 
Household Size = 4  0.0370  -2.0  0.0076  -12.5  0.0004  -72.5  0.9551  0.3 
Not Independent  0.0441  17.1  0.0146  68.2  0.0699  4882.9  0.8713  -8.5 
H. relative income = 75%  0.0453  20.1  0.0076  -12.4  0.0005  -66.4  0.9467  -0.6 
H. relative income = 25%  0.0314  -16.7  0.0099  14.1  0.0042  198.0  0.9545  0.2 
H. relative income = 0%  0.0261  -30.7  0.0113  30.2  0.0125  787.8  0.9501  -0.2 
W. relative income = 75%  0.0067  -82.2  0.0051  -41.5  0.0002  -85.2  0.9880  3.8 
W. relative income = 50%  0.0159  -57.9  0.0066  -23.5  0.0005  -61.5  0.9769  2.6 
W. relative income = 0%  0.0895  137.3  0.0113  30.7  0.0036  159.7  0.8956  -6.0 
Relative non-work income = 10%  0.0353  -6.4  0.0074  -14.2  0.0010  -31.6  0.9563  0.4 
Denmark  0.0162  -57.1  0.0095  9.2  0.0014  -1.2  0.9730  2.2 
Belgium  0.0301  -20.2  0.0200  130.5  0.0009  -39.4  0.9491  -0.3 
France  0.0090  -76.2  0.0506  483.4  0.0155  1002.2  0.9250  -2.9 
UK  0.0427  13.2  0.0123  41.4  0.0038  173.8  0.9412  -1.2 
Ireland  0.1297  244.1  0.0063  -27.1  0.0056  301.7  0.8583  -9.9 
Italy  0.1364  261.9  0.0364  320.3  0.0130  823.0  0.8142  -14.5 
Greece  0.0848  124.8  0.0158  81.9  0.0053  274.6  0.8942  -6.1 
Spain  0.0737  95.4  0.0053  -39.0  0.0072  411.8  0.9138  -4.0 
Portugal  0.0299  -20.6  0.0091  4.6  0.0010  -25.6  0.9599  0.8 
Note:  the reference couple has the following characteristics: husband 55 years old and wife  52, none of them with  higher education, none 
unemployed in  the initial period, both starting their working lifes at 18, with no part-time job, none working in the public sector, none self-
employed, living independently and without any other family member. The shares of the household income for the reference couple are : 25% 
wife income, 50% husband income and no capital income. 
33 Figure 2.a. Male labour force status by country in 1995. 
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Figure 2.b Female labour force status by country in 1995. 
+  unemployment 
Denmark  Holland  Belgium 
France  U.K.  Ireland 
Greece  Portugal 
16  25  35  45  55  65  16  25  35  45  55  65  16  25  35  45  55  65 
women,  1995 
36 Figure 3.a. Male labour force transitions in a three state model in EU12 by age. 
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37 Figure 3.b. Female labour force transitions in a three state model in EVI2 by age. 
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38 Figure 4.a. Male hazard out of the labour force  by country and age. 
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Figure 5. Male, Female and joint distribution of activities by age in EU12 in March 1994. 
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